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Abstract
Purpose - The paper discusses the new concept of ‘Multinational Investment Projects’ (MIPs) 
and  its  application  in  the  context  of  international  business  operations  in  China.  The 
petrochemical industry in China is used as the industrial context in which we investigate the 
interplay between the Chinese government, which encourages growth and investment activities 
in the sector, and the multinational petrochemical firms competing for global market share in  
this sector.
Design/methodology/approach -  We investigate the nature of the petrochemical value chain 
and the investment activities in all of its segments. Using an originally created database of the  
top 180 multinational investment projects in the petrochemical industry in China and additional 
context information the business environment in China, we review the investment strategies of 
multinational petrochemical corporations, and discuss their strategic choices for mode of entry  
in China, geographic location, and location within the value chain.
Findings -  The overview of multinational investment projects in the Chinese Petrochemical 
industry confirms the theoretical expectations of the critical impact of Chinese Government  
policies.  We  explain  the  emerging  shape  of  international  competition  in  this  sector  of  the 
Chinese economy. 
Originality/value - The main contributions of this paper are the new conceptual framework for 
analysis of the drivers for strategic investment choices, the assembly of a database with the top  
180 multinational investment projects in the petrochemical industry in China, and the analysis  
of the relationships between the regional endowments, concentration of value-chain activities  
and  location  choices  by  multinational  firms  from different  countries  of  origin.  Our  results 
demonstrate  the factors  that  drive growth in  a knowledge-intensive,  technology and capital 
intensive sector. 
Key words:  Multinational  Investment  Projects,  China,  Petrochemical  Industry,  Value 
Chain, Location advantages
1. Introduction
In response to the surging petrochemicals  demand,  the Chinese government  has paid a 
special attention to the petrochemical industry, liberalizing business rules and markets, and 
encouraging  an  increased  level  of  participation  from multinational  enterprises  (MNEs). 
These liberalization policies are creating a business climate and business conditions that are 
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conducive to the establishment and operations of multinational investment projects (MIPs), 
whereby multinational firms engage in investment activities in partnership with Chinese or 
other foreign firms. 
This paper examines the strategies adopted by MNEs in the petrochemical sector to form 
MIPs,  against  the  background  of  the  global  competition  and  the  domestic  business 
environment  in  China.  We  exploit  the  theoretical  argument  of  specific  environment–
strategy-performance (E-S-P) relationship, and attempt to analyze the fit between MNEs’ 
strategies  and the  dynamic  environmental  conditions.  The fit  between  strategy and the 
business environment is theorised as their mutual determination, where strategic choices 
mount to environmental conditions in a self-reinforcing relationship. This paper focuses on 
the MIPs in the petrochemical industry, which are established by MNEs in China with or 
without Chinese partners, and the impact of the business environment on the MNE strategic 
choices. Under strategic choices we investigate the choices of: geographic location, scope 
within the value chain, and mode of entry. 
We exploit the information available from a business directory on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in China containing data on 180 major MIPs in the petrochemical sector. We review 
the literature that establishes the theoretical foundations for analysis of MIPs and develop a 
new  multi-theoretical  framework  for  investigation  of  the  conditions  affecting  MNE 
strategies. We consider multiple factors that contribute to the uncertainty of environment 
affecting strategic choices during the MIP life cycle, including factors from the domestic 
and the global multi-partner and multi-cultural environment. 
2. The Nature of a Multinational Investment Project (MIP)
The  petrochemical  industry  is  an  industry  that  requires  multi-sector  and  multi-partner 
capabilities, which are assembled on a project basis. MNE investment in the petrochemicals 
is usually initiated by a project feasibility study, leading to the subsequent establishment of 
a  legal  entity  in  order  to  implement  the  project.  Projects  are  temporary  administrative  
structures  designed  to  achieve  specific  goals,  and  which  result  from  the  search  for  
horizontal cooperation in organizations (see also Harold,  2003). Complex projects may 
include both horizontal and vertical cooperation and coordination of activities (Keegan and 
Turner, 2001), and may span across multiple organisations. 
Projects can exhibit multiple forms, as they face different contexts and may aim at several 
kinds of goals. Projects result from various forms of cooperation between companies such 
as strategic alliances, partnerships, joint-ventures, or consortiums with other organizations 
that support the collaborative strategic efforts of the members (Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 
1989). Within these alliances and partnerships individual organisations pursue independent 
strategic aims, as well as shared goals. Often collisions of interests has to be resolved with 
political  negotiations  and  trade-offs.  As  a  result,  project  constellations  remain  fragile 
formations driven by contract liabilities and agreements where ownership and control do 
not bring directly competitive advantage.
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A project structure encompasses heterogeneous entities, or different types of individuals, 
organizations and institutional participants, who are co-located within a cooperation field 
(Todeva and Knoke, 2002) and experience mutual  influence (Grabher,  2002).  MIPs are 
established by one or more parties from different nationalities who contribute resources 
towards the business venture, where there is a link between domestic and foreign business 
operations. Examples of such MIPs are various turnkey contracts  (Young, 1989), cross-
border  infrastructure  projects,  and  collaborative  explorations.  MIPs  are  contract-based 
establishments  that  may  or  may not  include  ownership  clauses.  Hence,  there  could  be 
equity and non-equity element of the complex agreement.
In  the  literature  contracts  and  the  market  are  considered  to  be  effective  governance 
mechanisms for discrete transactions (Powell, 1990; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). On the 
other hand, hierarchical organizational forms are primarily associated with the production 
of wealth and the rationing of resources under unitary control (Zairi, 1999). A collaborative 
relationship such as an MIP is conducted as a long-term business relationship that includes 
repetitive  transactions  which  are  neither  sanctioned  by  a  market,  nor  monitored  by  a 
hierarchy  mechanism.  Relationship  costs  in  MIPs  can  emerge  out  of  opportunistic 
behaviour  of individual  partners,  or failure to negotiate  a common approach within the 
partnership.
MIPs  are  governed  by  negotiations  and  agreements  which  are  alternative  to  the  price 
mechanism (Hardy and Phillips, 1998). It is believed that collaborative relationships are 
better fitted to the local institutional conditions in China, rather than the capitalist market 
relationships (Phillips and Jeffery, 2000). Richardson (1996) describes such relationships as 
pre-planned repetitive trading relationships that facilitate production and accomplishment 
of  final  outcomes.  Such  collaborations  involve  specific  grouping  of  activities  and  co-
specialisation of individual organizational partners. 
Collaboration within MIPs can take place under different leadership. In case of a single 
MNE leading the investment activities in a specific segment of the Chinese petrochemical 
industry, the project is hosted by the MNE’s subsidiary in China. When the project involves 
a joint venture established with a Chinese partner-firm, the coordination and integration of 
project activities takes place within the joint venture. In cases of multi-agent leadership by 
two or more MNEs, the project control and coordination is distributed between different 
MNEs from different countries, with limited or extended involvement of Chinese firms and 
authorities. Multi-agent MIPs are complex business networks that involve a multitude of 
shared  resources,  knowledge,  and  coordination  of  operations  crossing  the  ownership 
boundaries of individual corporate entities (Todeva, 2006).
The effectiveness of such partnerships is attributed mainly to the division of labour, the 
specialisation of resources and capabilities, the co-alignment of aims, and the sharing of 
risks and liabilities. All these mechanisms require long-term optimisation of co-ordination 
and  control  that  ultimately  increases  the  interdependencies  between  partners  (Todeva, 
2006). The agency costs in MIPs multiply by the multi-agent structure of these projects, 
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and can not be easily offset by ultimate control (Jernsen and Meckling, 1976). Optimisation 
of control is also required for the co-alignment of interests by the partners. 
The multi-cultural aspect of MIPs only exacerbates the complexity of collaboration that is 
already  induced  from  technological  and  capital  requirements  of  the  multi-agent 
configuration. Most of the literature on joint ventures supports the cultural argument that 
JV activities depend on the country of origin (CoO) of the MNE. The motives for a joint 
venture are known to be different between the foreign and the domestic partners, which is 
expected to put more pressure on the coordination capabilities of individual partners. 
MIPs  in  the  high  value  added  segments  of  technology-intensive  and  capital-intensive 
industries seek to protect their knowledge base from spill-overs through optimization of 
management. The competitive advantage of their outputs is mainly embodied in scientific 
and technological applications, which partners try to protect from leakage and uncontrolled 
transfer of know-how. Hence, knowledge agreements are often part of MIPs.
The relationships with the Chinese government and with state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
also  add  a  further  layer  of  complexity  to  the  management  of  MIPs.  This  affects  the 
configuration of the MIPs, their contractual commitments, and their operation licenses. The 
domestic  business  environment  in  China  is  very  much  structured  by  various  policy 
initiatives  of  the  Chinese  government  that  shape  the  incentives  of  market  players 
throughout  the entire  value chain of  the petrochemical  industry.  Both input  and output 
markets of MIPs in this sector are externally influenced through policy initiatives. 
Before we discuss the complexity of this environment that influences the strategic choices 
of  MIPs  we  develop  an  overview  of  the  petrochemical  sector,  its  value  chain,  and 
relationships with other sectors of the economy, and the presence of foreign competition in 
each segment. 
3. The Value Chain of the Petrochemical Industry and Its Impact on MIP 
Strategies in China
The  value  chain  of  the  petrochemical  industry  explains  to  a  great  extent  the  strong 
government interest in its development. This is a key industry supplying a wide range of 
industrial products to the rest of the economy - from crude oil, to synthetic products and 
consumer goods (Fig. 1). It is a capital-intensive industry using complex type of processing 
technologies. The world’s largest multinational petrochemical companies have begun their 
investment operations in China since the 1990s and have shown a tendency for accelerating 
investment commitments, increasing market power, and broadening their investment range. 
Multinational  firms own advanced know-how and cutting-edge technology,  specially,  in 
certain areas of fine chemicals, functional chemicals, and specialty industrial chemicals. 
The  petrochemical  industry  embraces  numerous  activities  with  highly  complex 
relationships. There are significant difficulties to define the boundaries of the petrochemical 
industry  because  of  the  complexity  of  its  operations,  and the  diversity  of  its  products.  
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Figure  1 represents  the  core  value  chain  of  the  petrochemical  industry (shaded on the 
diagram) and its connectivity to other industrial sectors. 
The total volume of output is dominated by relatively few products, even though their range 
is vast. Well over half of the total output of the world petrochemical industry by weight is  
in the form of plastics and resins, and this broad group, together with synthetic fibbers and 
synthetic rubbers, accounts for more than three-quarters of the total investment output (Lu 
and Todeva, 2000). 
Figure 1: The petrochemical industry value chain
The petrochemical industry has higher degree of vertical integration, compared with other 
industries  (Kamakura,  2003).  Although  there  is  a  clear  structure  of  input  and  output 
markets,  there  is  a  lot  of  overlap  in  processing  technologies.  The  high  logistics  and 
transportation costs are another incentive for co-location and vertical integration of related 
operations.
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Source: Lu and Todeva, 2000
OIL EXPLORATION: FEEDSTOCK
Oil fractions, Natural gas
REFINING & BASIC PETROCHEMICALS:
Olefins and aromatics
DOWNSTREAM PETROCHEMICAL 
PRODUCT GROUPS:
Industrial chemicals
Plastics and resins
Synthetic rubbers
Synthetic fibres
DOWNSTREAM: CHEMICAL 
PROCESS INDUSTRIES:
Processed rubber, plastics, fibres, detergents, paints,
dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals, agrochemical,
adhesives, etc.
THE PETROCHEMICAL
INDUSTRY
CHEMICAL
INDUSTRY
sold petrochemicals
purchased chemicals
chemical conversion
GOODS FOR CONSUMERS:
Food, clothing, housing, health,
transports, etc.
OTHER  INDUSTRIES:
Metals, glass, cement,
automobile, paper, food
agriculture, etc.
PETROL
STATIONS
The complex value chain relationships reflect the complexity of the industrial environment, 
which is an intricate part of the overall Chinese business environment. The petrochemical 
segments  could  be  roughly classified  as  crude  oil,  oil  refining  and cracking  (i.e.  basic 
petrochemicals), and downstream petrochemical segments (including a number of chemical 
process industries such as rubber, plastics, fibbers, dyers and adhesives, agrochemicals and 
pharmaceuticals (Fig. 1). Wholesale and retail of petrochemicals and petroleum products 
has emerged as a new segment of the value chain in China, where liberalisation policies 
have invited new market entries and competition in the previously in-company operations 
of the Chinese Conglomerates of Sinopec (China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation), 
CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) and CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation). 
Figure  2:  Distribution  of  MIPs  in  sub-segments  of  the  petrochemical  industry  in 
China
   
All top 100 petrochemical  MNEs from Europe,  US, Japan and Korea have invested in 
China  and  their  investments  spread  across  all  segments  of  the  industry.  Data  on  the 
location, country of origin of the lead MNEs, ownership structure and industry segment for 
each  project  was  collected  for  a  selection  of  the  top  180  MIPs  in  the  petrochemical 
industry. This data is extracted from the ‘Reference Document for Foreign Investment in 
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Oil Exploration
BP (U.K), Shell (Netherland), Philips (Netherlands), 
TOTAL ELF (France), Chevron (U.S), Exxon Mobile (U.S), 
Iwai (Japan), Mitsui (Japan), Marubeni (Japan)
Idemitsu (Japan), Japan Energy (Japan)
Downstream Petrochemicals
Berkshire Hathaway (US), Dow (US), Du Pont (US), Chevron (US), 
Exxon Mobile (US), Philips (Netherlands), Goodyear (US), BP (UK), 
Bayer (Germany), Ciba (Switzerland), Hoechst AG (Germany), 
Akzo-Nobel (Netherlands), Rhdne-Poulenc S.A (France), 
Eni S.p.A (Italy) TOTAL ELF (France), Shell (Netherlands), 
BASF (Germany), Mitsui (J), Idemitsu (J), Mitsubishi (Japan), 
Bridgestone (Japan), Itochu (Japan), Sumitomo (Japan), 
LG (Korea), SK (Korea), Michelin (France), Iwai (Japan), 
Marubeni (Japan), Jardine Matheson (Hong Kong) 
Refining
Exxon Mobile (US), Shell (Netherlands), BP (UK), BASF (Germany)
ATOFINA (France), TOTAL ELF (France), Dow (U.S)
Petrol Stations
BP (UK), Shell (Netherlands), 
Exxon Mobile (US)
Petrochemical  Industry’  by  Shanghai  Foreign  Investment  Commission 
(www.investment.gov.cn/file0/13.pdf)  and  the  online  Chinese  national  information  centre 
(http://www.ceie.com.cn/).  The lead MNEs in our selection are all listed in ‘Fortune 500’. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of these MNEs’ operations within the petrochemicals value 
chain in China.
Most  investments  in the petrochemical  industry are  typically  in  the higher  value-added 
segments  of  chemicals,  oil  refining,  processing  refined  oil,  oil  distribution,  and  petrol 
stations. Foreign companies in China are not only involved in production of final output 
from  upstream  to  downstream,  but  also  include  in  their  portfolio  related  intermediate 
products. With the opening of the market for finished oil products, MNEs have expanded 
their business to other related sectors, such as the distribution, storage and infrastructure 
areas.  These  operations  are  becoming  an  important  complement  in  the  petrochemical 
manufacturing business, particularly in the cases of Shell, Exxon, and BP. Oil refining is 
the  sector  with  the  least  MNEs  investments,  while  the  downstream  petrochemicals 
segments have attracted the largest amount of FDI, especially from Japan and Korea (see 
figure 2 and table 1). This distribution is induced by the specific government restrictions in 
the  industry  and  the  nature  of  the  capital  investment  risks  and  particularly  the  high 
investment risks in the upstream segments.
The  composition  of  partners  in  individual  MIPs  is  also  an  evidence  of  successful 
government strategies to attract FDI and to spread the capabilities of these foreign investors 
across  the  entire  value  chain.  Our  database  with  the  top  180  largest  MIPs  in  the 
petrochemical  industry  in  China  provides  a  good foundation  for  the  assessment  of  the 
factors that influence and the outcomes from the strategic choices of these large project 
operations. The next section of the paper discusses the theoretical foundations that explain 
these influences. 
4. Antecedents to MIP Strategic Choices 
International  business  research  has  continued  to  broaden the  scope of  the  field  and  to 
address different  aspects of FDI and foreign market  operations,  including:  entry modes 
(Kogut and Singh, 1988), forms of ownership (Gomes-Casseres, 1990), and the location of 
operations in sites within a host country (Swamidass, 1990). A stream of work has studied 
the wide variety of conditions influencing FDI decisions, including home market and host 
market conditions. Among such factors are resource endowments for particular locations, 
market opportunities, efficiency and cost-related factors, and access to strategic assets such 
as knowledge and technology.  Dunning (2009) contrasts  these factors  in a  typology of 
motives for location of FDI: a) resource seeking; b) market seeking; c) efficiency seeking; 
and d) strategic asset seeking.
While this existing research represents the broad context for our study, none of the theories 
can  serve  as  immediate  foundations  for  investigating  the  antecedents  to  MIP  strategic 
choices.  The  main  reason  for  that  is  the  dominant  assumption  in  the  literature  that 
international  business  operations  are  driven  primarily  by  corporations  that  exercise  a 
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unitary form of decision making and control. Although the literature on strategic alliances 
and joint ventures makes a major contribution in the discussion on collaborative strategies 
and co-alignment of interests, the theoretical and empirical foundations for such research 
are lacking integration with major strategic management concepts such as: the value chain, 
economies  of  scope,  environmental  fit,  and  collaborative  advantage.  In  addition,  the 
international  business  literature  is  still  dominated  by  transaction  cost  economics,  and 
greatly ignores the institutional factors and processes that shape the business environment 
in host and home countries. The present study seeks to fill this gap in existing theory and to 
investigate  the  complexity  of  factors  that  affect  the  formation  of  MIPs,  including 
characteristics  of  the  institutional  and  technological  environment  specific  to  the 
petrochemical industry and specific to the Chinese political context that shapes strategic 
decisions of MIP partners.
This  paper  attempts  at  a  synthesis  of  several  approaches  that  underpin  a  theoretical 
investigation  of  the  driving  forces  behind  MIPs.  The  early  work  of  Bain  (1959)  on 
industrial  organization,  found  that  structural  conditions  determine  the  behaviour  and 
subsequent  firm’s  performance.  According  to  the  structure-conduct-performance  (SCP) 
framework  (Scherer,  1996),  industry  structure  influences  firms’  conduct  which  in  turn 
impacts both on the industry structure and the performance of individual firms. Industry 
structure  affects  firm  choices  via  a  number  of  mechanisms  such  as  barriers  to  entry, 
concentration  of  market  power,  and  the  level  of  competition.  Contingency theory  also 
emphasizes  the  impact  of  environmental  conditions,  and  promotes  the  idea  that 
organizations should design their strategies to fit the environment (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967; Donaldson, 2001). The notion of strategic alignment has emerged in many empirical 
studies in the organization literature, which fundamental proposition is that organizational 
performance is the consequence of the fit between two or more factors such as strategy, 
structure, technology, culture, and environment (Burns and Stalker, 1961).
Being  a  multi-agent  agglomeration,  an  MIP  with  shared  control  represents  a  common 
strategy,  negotiated  and  adopted  by  the  agents  that  co-align  to  multiple  industrial  and 
country environments. Such co-alignment includes the home market of the MNE, the host 
market environment in China, and the global business environment.
With  respect  to  the  MNE,  John  Dunning’s  OLI  (1993)  (ownership,  location  and 
internalisation) framework is used to analyse the effect of firm-specific, industry-specific 
and host country factors on MNEs’ strategic choices. This framework, however, treats the 
multinational firm as a uniform strategic agent, rather then as a business network of agents 
co-aligned to common strategic aims. The resource-based-view of the firms (RBV) on the 
other  hand  puts  more  emphasis  on  the  internal  resource  structure  (Barney,  1991),  and 
regards organizational  resources, skills and competencies as having a greater impact on 
firm’s strategies. In the international management and strategy literature, firm and industry 
heterogeneity are discussed in the context of factors such as subsidiary-specific variables 
(the nationality of the parent, the age of the operation, the embeddedness of the MNE in the 
host market, or the size of the subsidiary and its impact on the host market. 
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The link  between strategic  choices  and competitive  advantage  of  the  MNE remains  an 
assumption  in  the  strategic  management  literature  that  focuses  primarily  on  bundling 
internal capabilities and ignores collaborative advantage that derives from partnerships, or 
the  impact  of  externalities  such  as  co-location  of  firms,  government  policies  and 
institutional  practices.  Overall,  the  conceptualisation  of  the  environment  into  political, 
economic,  social,  and  technological  (Porter,  1980)  does  not  facilitate  more  critical 
evaluation of the institutional impact and the role of government policy.  The distinction 
between domestic and foreign business environment and the generic reference to the global 
business  environment  also  serves  as  a  barrier  to  recognising  its  full  impact  through 
multinational  and  multilateral  business  interactions.  The  MIP  concept  embraces  the 
complexity of the internal structuring of resources and external leveraging of capabilities. 
The political sensitivity around the growth of the Chinese petrochemical sector requires a 
full recognition of the interaction between Chinese and foreign partners, and the impact of 
local and global competition and the host government and foreign corporate policies and 
strategies on this interaction.
The complexity of the global  environment  for petrochemical  products is  more  then the 
combined environments in China and in various domestic markets, where the multinational 
firms originate from. Therefore, a fundamental challenge to analysis of MIPs is the level of 
alignment  in  strategic  coordination,  given  the  influence  from  different  economic  and 
regulatory environments  on the partners.  Strategic  coordination in  a multi-agent  project 
network will be affected by the constraints and opportunities from the environment in their 
domestic market, as well as from other countries of operation (Todeva, 2006), and the host 
environment in China. 
MIP strategic choices are affected also by the firm attributes of all members of the MIP 
network, and in particular – the lead MNE. The strategic choices, however, of the MIP 
partners  are  moderated  by  the  environmental  conditions  and  the  industrial  competitive 
forces within individual segments of the petrochemical value chain (Fig. 3).
Figure 3: Antecedents to MIP Strategic Choices
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Industry competitive forces in terms of Porter five forces’ determine potential profitability 
in an industry and provide the basis  for effective strategy formulation to sustain above 
average return on investment, or to control competitive advantage (Porter, 1980). These 
industry forces,  commonly used in  strategic  analysis,  are  barriers  to  new market  entry, 
substitutes, bargaining power of buyers and suppliers, and the nature of competition in an 
industry segment. These however, assume lack of institutional interventions such as pricing 
policies and investment priorities set by the government.
As a result of synthesis of this broad literature, we have identified 3 groups of factors that 
affect strategic choices at the level of MIPs (Fig. 3).These are: MNE specific factors (which 
we  capture  with  the  concept  of  ‘country  of  origin’;  the  host  country  institutional 
environment  (which  we  investigate  through  Chinese  government  policies  that  induce 
constraints and opportunities for foreign investors in the petrochemical industry); and the 
industry forces (or the specific technology / capital / resource intensity and the market risk 
of individual segments of the petrochemical value chain).
Impact of MNE factors 
The main attributes of the MNEs that contribute to their MIP strategies are: country of 
origin,  scale  and scope of  global  operations,  technological  capabilities  within  the 
industry value chain,  collaborative  experience,  and experience  within the Chinese 
market.  MNEs  in  the  global  petrochemical  industry  have  different  scope  of 
operations determined to a great extent by their access to oil-extraction facilities, their 
technological  integration  with  refining  operations,  their  industrial  links  to  the 
chemical  industry,  capabilities  in  various  downstream  process  technologies,  and 
established  distribution  facilities.  Many  of  these  characteristics  are  strongly 
influenced by their country of origin, their history and international experience. The 
diversification within the petrochemical industry and across other related industries is 
very much shaped by strategic choices of the MNE which are path-dependent from 
their establishment.
These characteristics are strong determinants for the type  of wholly owned subsidiaries 
(Roth and Morrison, 1992; Taggart, 1997). In cases of collaborative ventures such as MIPs, 
selecting MIP ownership structure depends on many factors, including: industry segment, 
the  project  initiators  and  their  financial  and  technological  capabilities,  the  business 
environment in the host region, including tax incentives and other regulatory factors, and 
the priorities set by the Chinese government. In global industries such as the petrochemical 
industry,  a  foreign  firm may seek alliance  either  with a  local  partner,  or  with another 
foreign firm in order to share country risks (Pan and Tse, 1996). Following from this, the 
ownership structure of the MIP could vary by the number of participants - from only one 
MNE, or several firms from Chinese or foreign origin.
Impact of Institutional factors 
The institutional  environment  in  a  host  economy is  one of  the critical  elements  of  the 
business environment of an MNE. The local institutions provide incentives, constraints and 
business  support  infrastructure  enhancing  performance  (Lewin  et  al.,  1999;  Lewin  and 
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Koza, 2001). Government regulations have been consistently discussed as part of the firm’s 
environment  (Thompson,  1967;  Kohli  and  Jaworski,  1990).  MNEs  entering  emerging 
economies  have  to  consider  upfront  the  specific  regulatory  environment  in  the  host 
economy. MNE decisions are also moderated at multiple stages by political negotiations 
with host governments that have indirect impact on future performance. MNEs are likely to 
confront a significant  level of complex government  decisions.  Such institutional  factors 
trigger  multiple  efforts  towards co-alignment  of interests  between domestic  and foreign 
actors,  including  the  host  government  and  the  foreign  multinational.  The  multi-agent 
structure of an MIP requires co-alignment of multiple interests, capabilities and strategic 
orientation of individual MIP member organisations.  
The institutional  environment in a host country determines significantly the way MNEs 
engage  in  investment  activities,  and  how  local  firms  respond  to  foreign  competition. 
Government  regulations  are  introduced  to  protect  domestic  companies’  assets  and  to 
encourage  new  infusions  of  capital,  technology  and  management  know-how  into  the 
economy.  Although  China  is  undergoing  a  transition  of  the  economic  system  from  a 
centrally planned economy towards a market-oriented one, the government influence is still 
overwhelming particularly in the petrochemical sector (Child and Tse, 2001). Provided that 
China  includes  vast  territories  and a  number  of  regions  with  specific  regional  policies 
designed to  attract  FDI,  we would  expect  that  different  regions  would  attract  different 
concentration of MIPs.
In a centrally planned economy in transition, institutional forces are generally stronger and 
more complex than in a free-market economy (Peng and Heath, 1996). As a consequence, 
foreign enterprises are particularly constrained by cognitive and socio-political pressures, 
and hence cannot freely make strategic choices. These institutional constraints are raised by 
governments for the purpose of efficiency (Roberts and Greenwood, 1997) and control over 
the market power of dominant firms. Hence, we expect that institutional factors will play 
predominant role in distribution of investment activities in China. 
Our focus is limited to the institutional environment of a host country that comprises of 
foreign policy, laws, and regulations, affecting incentives, costs, and operations of the MIP. 
Previous studies of the impact of institutional factors on entry modes cover issues related to 
political hazards (Delios and Henisz, 2000), legal restrictions on foreign ownership (Delios 
and Beamish, 1999; Yiu and Makino, 2002) and host-country risks in general (Brouthers et 
al., 2004).  Entry barriers are considered to originate from political and social constraints, 
and are regarded as factors that induce inter-firm cooperation (Hitt, et al, 2004). 
The impact of institutional factors is explained with the organisational ecology argument. 
In  order  to  cope  with  isomorphic  pressures,  to  attain  legitimacy  and  to  increase  the 
opportunity for survival, an organization must adjust its structures and processes (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Example of such isomorphic behaviour is 
the acceptance by MNEs to engage in joint ventures in capital intensive and technology 
intensive  sectors  as  a  second  best  option  with  high  risk,  coordination  costs  and 
interdependence on Chinese government decisions. A moderating factor in this process is 
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the liberalisation that took place in China as part of its transition to WTO membership, 
which served as an incentive to MNEs. 
Before 2007 and the WTO entry, Sinopec was authorized by the Chinese government as the 
sole oil distributor for China. During this stage, MNEs had to choose a joint venture mode 
of entry in the oil distribution segment, and to team up with branches of Sinopec, or other 
Chinese firms. The opening of China’s economy from early 2007 allowed more domestic 
private  companies  and foreign companies  to  established independent  operations,  and in 
particular, to enter the crude oil distribution market. 
With  the  gradual  opening of  the  domestic  market  in  China,  MNEs were  progressively 
allowed to form sole control MIPs. Restrictions that were eliminated in conjunction with 
the  WTO  membership  have  been  related  to  trade  and  foreign-exchange  balance 
requirements, to local content requirements and export performance requirements, as well 
as foreign ownership restriction on refining operations. This, liberalisation was conducted 
with the knowledge that Chinese state-owned companies significantly dominate the crude 
and oil product markets, where MIPs have relatively small market share. The direct impact 
of  the  institutional  environment  is  most  visible  in  relation  to  the  approval  criteria  and 
process by which the Chinese government has allowed operations by MNEs. 
The lengthy approval process by central government in the past had created incentives for 
foreign investors to build small plants and to break large projects down into smaller phased 
projects.  The  central  government  has  become  aware  that  such  investment  strategies 
undermine its energy efficiency goals, and has made efforts to discourage the small-scale 
MIPs (Tan, 1997), and to attract more large scale and integrated projects. Such political 
requirements  are  becoming  a  driving  force  in  shaping  future  MIP  strategies  and 
partnerships, and represent a clear form of direct institutional impact.
Impact of Industry forces
The implementation of government policies driven by political and economic objectives 
has been shaping all sectors of the Chinese economy. The structure of the petrochemical 
industry is a product of such policies. An industry structure comprises of technical (Gomes-
Casseres,  1989)  and  economic  dimensions  (Bain,  1972)  within  which  firms  compete. 
Industry structure is expressed by different segments of the value chain, where different 
MIP strategic choices prevail - both in terms of geographic location, and location within the 
value chain (or industry scope of operations). 
Research in the past has suggested that industry characteristics influence the choice of entry 
mode  for  international  operations.  Greenfield  investments  are  considered  as  the  most 
appropriate mode of entry for technologically intensive operations because through them 
companies reduce the chances of dissemination of knowledge and firm-specific advantages 
(Hennart and Park, 1993). On the other hand, it is argued, that firms would be more likely 
to establish JVs when they enter into an R&D intensive industry (Kogut and Singh, 1988), 
and in a growth industry (Hennart, 1991), in order to share R&D costs and risks. Hence, 
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there are theoretical expectations in both directions. Segments of the value chain with high 
technology intensity may attract both Greenfield and JV investments.
A number of studies have observed a positive relationship between asset specificity and 
higher level of ownership (Kim and Hwang, 1992; Erramilli and Rao, 1993), and this is 
particularly important for the petrochemical industry, which involves a lot of asset-specific 
investment decisions.  Luo (2001) suggests that if the asset specificity of the industry is 
high,  an MNE seeking long-term profitability is  likely to  choose a sole ownership that 
facilitates  the  receipt  of  sustained  financial  returns  generated  from  monopolistic  or 
oligopolistic positions. Following from these studies, we may expect that segments of the 
petrochemical  value  chain  that  exhibit  high  asset  specificity,  such  as  refining  or  other 
processes, will be associated with modes of entry that involve more equity control. 
Most of this literature assumes that the institutional environment is indifferent to choices of 
foreign market entry. However, in the context of China, the requirements for substantial 
equity control by the MNE are moderated by the Government requirements for control over 
the petrochemical sector, and hence, we may expect mixed forms, or equity joint ventures, 
facilitating shared control. 
High industry competition has also been recognized as an influential factor on entry mode 
choice.  As an environmental factor competition induces motives to select an ownership 
form that allows foreign firms to exercise significant control (Kim & Hwang, 1992; Pan, 
1996).  This  however,  may  not  be  realised  due  to  other  moderating  factors,  such  as 
institutional and technological requirements imposed by the host government. 
Industry competition  is  mainly associated  with  the concentration  of  firms  in  individual 
segments. Subsequently, an industry’s concentration level implies the degree of monopoly 
power that the MNEs could exercise (Luo, 2002). One of the leading arguments suggests 
that  high  levels  of  industry  competition  lead  to  the  establishment  of  jointly  owned 
subsidiaries (Hennart and Larimo, 1998), as companies seek to share the risks. Beamish 
(1985)  argues  that  the  degree  of  competition  in  a  particular  industry  affects  both  the 
configuration and the stability of JVs. As a result,  we may expect that segments of the 
petrochemical industry that are exposed to direct industry competition, will host more joint 
venture type of investments, which is an ownership form that receives most institutional 
support by the government as well. 
Determinants of geographic location choices and positioning within the value chain
In our theoretical framework by location choices we mean both geographic location, and 
location  or  positioning  within  the  value  chain.  The  theories  that  inform  us  about 
determinants  of  location  choices  come  mainly  from the  strategic  management  and  the 
economic geography literature. The emphasis has been mainly on the co-location of firms 
in geographic regions, and its impact on local labour market and local economic growth 
(Piore and Sabel, 1984, Doeringer and Terkla, 1995). 
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The  existing  international  business  literature  on  the  choice  of  location  by  MNEs  has 
focused either on host country characteristics (location advantages), or on the impact of 
firm and industry characteristics in the host economy (internalisation advantages gained 
through strategic asset seeking) (Dunning, 2009). Dunning (1993) explains the rationale for 
investment location choices, and develops the argument that location advantages can be 
industry-specific as well as country-specific. The close relationship between agglomeration 
dynamics  in  specific  geographic  regions  and  the  location  of  FDI  has  also  been 
acknowledged (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1986; Krugman, 1991; Birkinshaw, 2000).
Firms prefer to enter a region that already has a large pool of workers and other firms, even 
if  they  forgo  some  monopoly  power  (Amiti  and  Pissarides,  2005).  Among  the  main 
regional  ‘attractors’  are:  regional  resource  endowments,  a  pool  of  educated  labour, 
innovation  capabilities  and  universities,  support  infrastructure,  local  and  global  market 
reach, presence of other foreign investors, low trade barriers, and other related industry 
sectors (Goldstein and Gronberg 1984; Amiti and Pissarides 2005). Therefore, it could be 
expected  that  industry  concentration  or  competition  in  a  region  will  attract  additional 
foreign investments to that region. Existing domestic firms and foreign firms in a region 
may exert different effects on new foreign firms, as they have different access to political 
resources and different market power. Geographic distribution of foreign firms results also 
from  differences  in  investors’  preferences  which  depend  on  their  sector  of  activity 
(Markusen and Venables, 1995). MNEs select segments of the value chain as a result of 
their capabilities, as well as the regional specificities. They may engage in mergers and 
acquisitions of foreign assets, driven by the gap of their capabilities, therefore seeking to 
improve their economies of scope.
In  summary  from  the  theoretical  perspectives  discussed  above,  we  have  adopted  an 
approach that investigates multiple factors affecting MIP strategies. According to our multi-
theoretic  framework,  described  in  Fig.  3,  the  firm’s  environment  encapsulates  the 
environmental pressures and in particular those stemming from institutional barriers and 
government  policies  and  decisions.  These  factors  are  location  specific  -  for  different 
regions in China, and industry specific – for different segments of the industry value chain. 
MNE strategies to invest in different locations in China, in different segments of the value 
chain, and to employ a variety of modes of market entry will be determined both by the 
specific characteristics of the MNE and the moderating influence of the host institutional 
and industrial environment, as well as other members of the MIP. 
We distinguish between characteristics of the lead MNE and characteristics of the MIP. 
While the MNE selects mode of entry in the context of its strategic motives, the decision 
for the MIP formation is very much moderated by the Chinese government. As a result, we 
treat mode of entry as an outcome of MIP strategies, negotiated between the MNE and the 
other Chinese and foreign counterparts. Ones established, the MIP develops as a business 
formation and begins to affect its environment through its capabilities and strategic intent.
The  MIP  characteristics  that  affect  all  other  strategic  choices  include:  government 
endorsement, age, size, composition of the partnership, country of origin of each partner, 
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including their strategic capabilities and the specific characteristics of the lead MNE. These 
MIP choices further affect the interaction with the environment through co-evolution and 
mutual adaptation (Todeva, 2007).
We discuss the MIP strategy as an outcome from the characteristics of the lead MNE and 
other  partners,  from the  influence  of  the  industry  structure  and  the  associated  with  it 
competition (or industry forces at specific targeted segments of the value chain), and from 
the host institutional environment in China (Fig. 3). In the context of the petrochemical 
industry in China, the institutional environment varies in different geographic locations and 
in different segments of the value chain, due to specific regional and industrial policies. 
We discriminate  between 4 types of geographic locations – mainland China,  liberalised 
economic  zones  on  the  east  cost,  locations  around  major  metropolitan  cities  (such  as 
Beijing, Hong Kong and Shanghai), and strategic locations containing major transportation 
arteries and hubs. For our comparison we have selected 4 regions:
- The Pearl River Delta covering Guangzhou and Fujian province - consists of a 
number of the earliest special economic zones (SEZs) established since 1980, with the 
major metropolitan and global city of Hong Kong, and the major transportation arteries 
of Pearl River Delta and Hong Kong International Port, with access to major consumer 
markets and industries in the area and in mainland Chia, and access to off-shore oil 
extraction facilities in the South China see.  
- Yangtze River Delta with Shanghai as its kernel, including among others Nanjing, 
Suzhou, and Ningbo SEZs established since 1985-1988, with major international port 
facilities  at  Shanghai  and the  Yangtze  River  Delta  as  transportation  roots  to  major 
inland  provinces,  with  an  established  industrial  basis  of  steel,  heavy  industry, 
equipment manufacturing and petrochemicals.
- Bohai Economic Rim includes the economic hinterland surrounding Beijing, and 
the coastal provinces of Tianjin, Hebei and Shandong which surround the Bohai Sea, 
with numerous SEZs with established heavy industries and manufacturing and access to 
new off-shore oil extraction facilities in the Bohai Bay area.
- The  Central  and  Western  Regions includes  5  inland  autonomous  regions 
(Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet and Xinjiang) and 7 neighbouring to them 
provinces  (Chongqing,  Gansu,  Guizhou,  Qinghai,  Shaanxi,  Sichuan  and  Yunnan)  – 
enormous pool of labour and consumer market,  some tax incentives and preferential 
policies,  but  limited  industrialisation,  scarce  natural  resources  and  located  at  long 
distance from the eastern coast.
The MIP strategies that emerge under the influence of specific institutional and economic 
environment in each region and the global competition in the entire petrochemical sector 
include entry mode for the foreign partner, location choice, and industry scope. All three 
elements of the MIP strategy are strongly influenced by the lead MNE preferences and 
capabilities, by the strategic choices of the Chinese government (or what we refer to as the 
impact of the institutional forces), by the competitive and demand conditions in individual 
regions  and  by  the  specific  industry  environment  in  individual  segments  of  the 
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petrochemical industry, and the risk / technology / capital intensity, or what we refer to as 
industry forces. 
For the investigation of the MIP strategies we compare the number of investment projects 
in each segment of the value chain and in each selected region. Our underlying assumptions 
are the following:
- MNEs with  specific  capabilities  (and other  characteristics  that  stem from their  
country  of  origin) will  select  specific  regions  and  specific  segments  of  the 
petrochemical value chain; among the MNE-specific  characteristics,  listed in the 
literature, are the following:
o country of origin;
o size;
o international experience;
o production capacity and specific technological capabilities;
o technological and resource constraints.
- Regions with  strong  regional  endowments will  attract  higher  concentration  of 
MIPs; among the regional endowments, listed in the literature, are the following: 
o attractive labour market; 
o concentration of factors of production, including proximity to oil extraction 
facilities; 
o high  level  of  industrialisation  and  industry  demand  for  petrochemical 
products, including high level of consumer demand; 
o advanced support infrastructure such as transportation and logistics;
o existing high agglomeration of domestic and foreign firms;
o intensive import/export activities demonstrating growth; 
o preferential government policies and special incentives.
- Segments of the value chain that exhibit  high capital and technology intensity and 
high competition will attract both types of entry modes - joint venture investments 
(for  sharing  risk)  and  wholly  owned  subsidiaries  (for  control);  among  the 
characteristics  of  specific  industry  segments,  listed  in  the  literature,  are  the 
following:
o capital intensity and associated with it investment risk;
o technology intensity and associated with it knowledge spill-over risk;
o level of local/ global competition and associated with it market risk
o preferential government policies.
In  this  context  we  treat  location  choices  as  dependent  variables,  the  institutional  and 
industrial environment in regions as independent variables, and the characteristics of the 
lead MNE as moderating variables.
5.  Analysis  of  the  Outcomes  from  Strategic  Choices  by  MIPs  in  the 
Petrochemical Industry in China
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The  Chinese  large  petrochemical  producers  all  operate  under  the  big  three  integrated 
enterprises, Sinopec (China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation), CNPC (China National 
Petroleum Corporation) and CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation). These 
firms remain dominant producers and sellers of petrochemical products in all key markets. 
MIPs in China face direct competition both from the local Chinese players and from other 
global players.  For example,  the global  resin industry has five major players  excluding 
China, but the Chinese resin segment has nearly 100 such companies and MIPs that operate 
in the domestic market in this segment (Floyd, 2002). 
Many Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are capable of producing high quality and 
perfectly serviceable products, despite their  financial  difficulties.  As a result,  MIPs that 
involve a merger, an alliance or a joint venture with a Chinese company, gain competitive 
advantage and establish a strong market position. In some cases, the Chinese partner in a 
JV continues to operate its older facilities, posing a latent threat to its own JV activities. 
U.S, Europe, Japan and Korea are the main investors in the Chinese petrochemical industry 
that  compete  with each other  as  much as they compete  with the Chinese ‘big-three’  – 
Sinopec,  CNOOC, and CNPC. Furthermore,  home environment  and culture  distance  of 
these MNEs does impact on the configuration of the MIP investment projects. For instance, 
U.S. MNEs tend to invest in projects with high technology intensity by themselves, while 
European MNEs hold more  positive  attitude  towards  technology cooperation  or  a  joint 
venture with a Chinese company. European MNEs engage in market-oriented MIPs, while 
Japanese and Korean MNEs prefer export-oriented wholly owned subsidiaries and projects 
(Park and Lee, 2003, Child, 2003). In the rest of this section, we analyse the variation of 
strategies and these can be explained with the ownership structure of the MIPs. We also 
investigate the relationships between the host environment, the MNEs, and their location 
choices  (including  both  geographic  location  and  location  within  the  value  chain).  We 
discuss how institutional and industry factors influence these choices.
MIP ownership structure as a strategic choice
The literature on mode of foreign market entry is dominated by the assumption that this is a 
choice  that  is  made  by  the  MNE,  and  this  choice  is  affected  by  both  -  its  internal 
capabilities, experience and strategic objectives, and the external environmental conditions. 
The mechanisms, however, remain little explored. The literature also acknowledges that the 
Chinese  government  actively  interfere  with  all  strategic  choices.  The  section  below 
explains these mechanisms and instruments used by the Chinese government to guide the 
strategic investment process in the petrochemical industry.
 
According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the institutional arrangements available 
for foreign investment  projects  in the Chinese oil  and petrochemical  sector are:  wholly 
owned ventures/projects (WOP), equity joint ventures/projects (EJV), and cooperative or 
contractual  joint  ventures/projects  (CJV).  The  distribution  of  MIPs  by  major  MNEs  is 
across all  modes of entry (Table 1) and all  segments  of the petrochemical  value chain 
(Table 1 and Table 2). 
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Table 1 classifies the top 180 MIPs in a matrix, based on three variables: country of origin 
(CoO) of the lead MNE, type of ownership and industry segment. In our selection of the 
largest MIPs we observe a distribution of modes of entry which is dominated by equity 
joint  ventures  (54%),  followed  by  WOP  (34%),  and  contractual  joint  ventures  (12%). 
WOPs cannot be used in every sector, because the government requires Chinese company 
participation  or  control  in  oil  refining  and  distribution.  For  example,  the  largest 
concentration of WOP is in the downstream segment (33%) of the total number of projects 
(Table 2), of which the Japanese MNEs have secured the largest stake (14%) (Table 1).
Table 1: Ownership structure of the major petrochemical MIPs in China (%= (count /  
total N of cases180)
Nb % Nb % Nb % Nb % Nb %
EJV 0 0% 3 1.7% 17 9.4% 1 0.6% 21 11.7%
CJV 1 0.6% 2 1.1% 0 0% 0 0% 3 1.7%
WOP 0 0% 0 0% 19 10.6% 0 0% 19 10.6%
ALL 1 0.6% 5 2.8% 36 20.0% 1 0.6% 43 24.0%
EJV 5 2.8% 5 2.8% 22 12.2% 2 1.1% 34 18.9%
CJV 8 4.4% 1 0.6% 1 0.6% 1 0.6% 11 6.1%
WOP 3 1.7% 0 0% 11 6.1% 0 0% 14 7.8%
ALL 16 8.9% 6 3.4% 34 18.9% 3 1.7% 59 32.8%
EJV 2 1.1% 0 0% 31 17.2% 0 0% 33 18.3%
CJV 7 3.9% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 7 3.9%
WOP 0 0% 0 0% 25 13.9% 0 0% 25 13.9%
ALL 9 5.0% 0 0% 56 31.1% 0 0% 65 36.1%
EJV 0 0% 1 0.6% 7 3.9% 0 0% 8 4.4%
CJV 1 0.6% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 0.6%
WOP 0 0% 0 0% 4 2.2% 0 0% 4 2.2%
ALL 1 0.6% 1 0.6% 11 6.1% 0 0% 13 7.2%
Total 27 15.0% 12 6.7% 137 76.1% 4 2.2% 180 100%
US
Europe
Japan
Other (Korea,
Singapore
Taiwan)
TotalPetrol StationDownstreamRefining
     Segment
CoO  
Type of 
Ownership Oil Exploration
Source: Investment Shanghai (2007). 
Note:  MIPs are sorted by CoO, the industry segment, and the legal status of MIPs (WOP, EJV,  
CJV). Percentages are calculated on the basis of our selection of 180 MIPs.
JVs  are  known to  benefit  foreign  investors  as  the  Chinese  partner  usually  has  certain 
strengths,  such as central  or local  government  support,  brand reputation,  land,  licenses, 
distribution facilities, and access to suppliers. These strategic capabilities of the Chinese 
partner reduce initial costs and improve the foreign investor’s chances of success. This is 
employed particularly by the European investors whose joint venture activities represent 
25% on the total investment activity in the Chinese petrochemical industry, followed by 
Japan (22%) and US (13%) (Table 1). The variation in ownership has increased along with 
the development of the reform.  
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Collaborative MIPs in oil exploration are usually governed by cooperative or contractual 
development agreement because of their short term, high risk and capital intensive nature. 
Table 1 indicates that CJV is the most applied type for oil exploration project (17 out of 27 
projects). As investments and exchanges tend to be short-term in oil extraction, flexibility is 
attained through switching partners and negotiating new terms of exchange as appropriate. 
In  addition,  most  of  these  operations  are  off-shore  and  in  territorial  waters,  where 
ownership advantages stay with governments. Another advantage of CJVs compared with 
WOPs is that they generally facilitate intangible and critical political alliances as well as 
secure access to scarce inputs like crude oil, foreign exchange and expertise. Foreign firms 
undertaking CJVs in the crude oil segment usually do so with local SOEs or other local 
governmental authorities. 
With regard to oil refining, there are only 12 projects lead by large MNEs from U.S and 
Europe (including one from Japan), with the dominant form of investment being EJVs and 
CJVs with  SOEs without  exception  (Table  2).  One of  the  earliest  MIPs  in  China  was 
established as a joint venture with Dow (US), and was established through all  kinds of 
diplomatic  negotiations.  Following Dow’s investment  in  the 1990s into the oil  refining 
segment,  ExxonMobil and Saudi Aramco also took lead in cooperation with Sinopec to 
build  a  large  integration  project  located  in  the  south  coast,  involving  oil  refining  and 
finished oil  products.  MIPs in  the refining  segment  are  still  scarce,  compared with the 
number of MIPs in other segments. The Chinese government still places some requirements 
on MIPs in the field of oil refining, such as the establishment of Sino-foreign joint ventures, 
the use of advanced technology, and the capability to supply crude oil externally. 
Table 2: Type of ownership by industry segment (%=count / total N of cases180)
Source: Investment Shanghai (2007). 
Note:   All MIPs are classified by the ownership type (CJV= contractual joint venture, EJV=equity 
joint venture, WOP= wholly owned project) and the industry segment. 
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100%1802.2%476.1%1376.7%1215.0%27Total
34.4%620.0%032.8%590.0%01.7%3WOP
53.9%971.7%342.8%775.6%103.9%7EJV
11.7%210.6%10.6%11.1%29.4%17CJV
Type of 
Ownership
%Count%Count%Count%Count%Count
TotalPetrol StationDownstreamRefiningOil Exploration
Industry Segment
The high level of capital intensity for investment in the refining segment is associated with 
great resource commitment and increases business and political risk for foreign firms (Chen 
and  Hu,  2002),  which  induces  the  need  by  MNEs  to  seek  ownership  advantages. 
Government  regulations  of  this  segment,  however,  have  not  permitted  WOP,  which 
confirms the expectation of strong government impact on the selection of ownership type. 
In addition, the competitive threat for MIPs from  SOEs in oil refining is very high. As a 
result, spreading the risk through JVs with SOEs has been also a safer choice for the MNEs. 
MIPs in downstream petrochemical segment have exhibited a different set of regulatory 
requirements,  and  as  a  result  their  strategic  choices  have  shifted  towards  more  equity 
control. Overall 43% of all MIPs are registered as EJV, and another 33% as WOP (Table 
2). In terms of production process, the downstream petrochemical sector (and especially 
fine chemicals) have lower capital intensity but higher technology intensity, higher product 
diversification, and higher value-added based on product innovations. This segment is less 
regulated and exhibits  fierce competition. Equity control has been preferred by MNEs in 
this  segment  in  order  to  protect  technology  and  know-how.  Nevertheless,  MIPs  are 
established  mostly  by  shared  ownership  which  could  be  explained  by  the  industry 
competition and some institutional constraints. At the time of the initial investment 43% of 
all MIPs are EJVs and 33% are WOPs (Table 2).
MIP in distribution of finished oil products is an emerging investment area in China and 
exhibits more diversified strategies. Since the elimination of market restriction in wholesale 
and retail of petroleum in 2004, this segment has become the focus of interest by foreign 
petrochemical  companies.  However,  foreign  companies  entering  this  segment  face 
intensive competition from established SOEs. In response to this situation, MIPs have taken 
three main strategies: establishment of equity joint ventures with Sinopec and CNPC to 
build  gas  stations;  mergers  or  acquisitions  of  local  private  gas  stations;  and  strategic 
alliance with other distribution companies. For example, in 2004, subsidiaries of Shell and 
BP acquired and formed EJVs type of projects with 1500 petrol station and sales networks.  
BP strengthened its market position through strategic alliance with a Chinese automobile 
manufacturer Dongfeng, signing a 50/50 JV contract and the car manufacturer committed 
to recommend BP’s oil brand to the customers.  ExxonMobil and Total ELF also have set 
up  new  subsidiaries  with  Chinese  domestic  petrochemical  giants  to  construct  retail 
networks for the refined oil products . In 2005 and 2006, Shell’s projects in oil retail were 
accepted by the government which included an EJV with a Chinese private firm and a sole 
venture in Shandong province. By 2006, Shell had established more than 70 own-brand gas 
stations in three metropolitan areas (http://www.chinacsr.com/). The number of MIPs in 
this segment, however, remains small – only 4 projects in total (Table 2).
Location of MIPs in a geographic area
According  to  distribution  statistic  of  petrochemical  MIPs  published  by  the  Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce, there are four locations in China. These are the Pearl River delta 
(L1), the Yangtze River regions (L2), around the Bohai Bay and large cities in North China 
(L3), and central and western provinces (L4). These geographic locations are characterised 
by  a  significant  diversity  in  economic  development,  transport  infrastructure,  industry 
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concentration,  and government policy.  Local conditions are inevitably influenced by the 
local government policies and are path dependent on historical factors. The intensity of 
competition is also not uniform at regional and segment level. Location factors such as 
degree  and  content  of  favourable  trade  policies,  or  regional  investment  and  industrial 
policies,  vary across types of geographic locations.  Locations with  stronger government 
support,  higher  degree  of  industry agglomeration,  and less  institution  barriers  (such as 
Yangtze River regions along the east coast) have attracted more MIPs. 
Table 3: Location by type of ownership (%=count / total N of cases180)
Source: Investment Shanghai (2007). 
Note:   All MIPs are classified by the ownership type (EJV, CJV, WOP) and the location (L1= 
Pearl River delta; L2= Yangtze River regions; L3= Bohai Bay and large cities in 
North China; L4= Central and Western Regions). 
Tables 3 and 4 indicate the variation in location strategies by MIPs in China. The highest 
concentration of MIPs in the Yangtze River Delta surrounding Shanghai is striking – 53% 
of all MIPs, compared with 21% in the Pearl River Delta (anchored around Hong Kong). 
Looking at the profile of the two regions, they are similar in their regional endowments.  
Both have access to a global city, international air and water transportation facilities, good 
transportation access to inland China, and a number of SEZs with liberalized regimes.
The major cities in Pearl River delta (L1) were reformed as early as China started the ‘open 
door policy’, and they have become the most developed economic zones. Pearl River delta 
is recognized as the FDI preference location for MIPs because of low institutional barriers. 
The preferential policy to attract foreign investment has promoted the international trade of 
petrochemical  products,  which  has  especially  attracted  more  export-oriented  MIPs  and 
those strongly dependant on imported raw material. However, the structure of the regional 
economy with focus on light manufacturing industries confines the even distribution of 
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MIPs in different positions of the petrochemical value chain. For example, Guangdong and 
Fujian provinces in this region are the concentration destination of refining MIPs. This is 
because they are major consumer market, and have advantages for transporting crude oil 
and petroleum products to inland areas along the coast. They are also the location of two JV 
refineries that import crude oil from overseas. 
Table 4: Industry segment by country of origin of the lead MNE (%=count / total N of  
cases180)
Source: Investment Shanghai (2007). 
Note:   All MIPs are classified by the country of origin of the MNEs, the industry segment, and the  
location (L1= Pearl River delta;  L2= Yangtze River regions; L3= Bohai Bay and 
large cities in North China; L4= Central and Western Regions). 
The  potential  explanation  for  the  difference  between  the  two  regions  is  their  global 
connectivity. While Hong Kong in Pearl River Delta is more outward oriented with focus 
on exports,  Shanghai in Yangtze River Delta is more inward oriented attracting inward 
investment to complement its manufacturing base.         
The concentration of activities in L1 and L2 is as a result of the common characteristics of 
economic  development,  including  large  market  size,  and  advanced  infrastructure.  The 
Yangtze River location however, is an agglomeration of both MIPs and Chinese domestic 
enterprises,  which creates a different  environment,  compared with the Pearl  River delta 
location. There is a full range of activities along the entire petrochemical value chain in the 
provinces of Yangtze delta. Established petrochemical industry parks in this location are 
among the most important factors to attract MIPs. 
These industry parks are supported by the local governments, where preferential taxes are 
offered. For licensed operations of MIPs it is a precondition to establish cost-effective MIP 
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operations, that are able to optimize the use of public infrastructure, and to take advantage 
of cross-industry coordination within sectors, to avoid duplication of cost, to enable each of 
the  units  to  focus  on the  development  of  its  core  business,  and to  make  better  use  of 
synergies across co-located plants.
Another main MIP location (L3) is along Bohai bay and large cities in North China. This 
region  is  with  strong  foundation  of  domestic  petrochemical  industry  with  large  and 
integrated petrochemical facilities. Such areas include concentration in Shandong province, 
Tianjin, Hubei province and major cities in Hebei province.  Contrary to the concentration 
of  foreign  capital  in  Pearl  River  delta  and Yangtze  River  delta,  state-owned capital  is 
overwhelming in this region. Foreign companies are facing the challenges of competing 
with the largest Chinese firms in this sector. To reduce the threat of competition, MIPs in 
these cities and regions are located near a number of large or medium-sized local Chinese 
enterprises. Shared control between foreign and Chinese companies is predominant choice 
for  MIPs  in  this  location,  as  this  represent  combing  the  location  and  the  ownership 
advantages.  Three  quarters  of  MIPs  are  a  form of  a  joint  venture.  By setting  up  joint 
ventures and collaborative projects with Chinese companies, foreign MNEs have been able 
to  source  raw  materials  and  to  access  utilities  at  low  cost,  engineering  services  and 
marketing  knowledge  from  local  petrochemical  partners,  which  in  turn  reduce  their 
investment costs. 
Until  the  late  1990s,  the  investment  activities  in  the  petrochemical  industry  created 
fragmentation which dampened any integration effort. Subsequently, with the large number 
of new signed MIPs, many local governments have implemented preferential policies to 
develop  industry  districts  encouraging  large  integrated  projects.  The  improvement  of 
existing  industry  parks  has  attracted  more  large-scale  MIPs.  According  to  the  selected 
cases, 44% of MIPs decided to locate  their  project in Yangtze Delta,  and 95% of their 
production sites were located in industry parks, especially for the large refining and cracker 
projects.  The remaining  5% of  MIPs choose to  invest  in  other  locations  for  marketing 
purposes. The largest MIP in China’s petrochemical industry is an integration project which 
is a joint venture between Yangtze Petrochemical and BASF. 
Another factor to attract MIPs in these locations have been the infrastructure advantages 
such as: advanced transport system (water, air, rail and road) and a more comprehensive 
transport  infrastructure,  allowing  MIPs  to  solve  the  transportation  problem  for  raw 
materials. 
6. Conclusions
Our  study  utilizes  the  most  recent  data  from  China’s  industrial  census  and  business 
directory of MIPs. The principle effort in this paper is to discuss the proposition that both 
the  host  country  institutional  environment  and  the  industry  conditions  are  important 
determinants  of the strategic  investment  choices.  made by MNEs in their  operations  in 
China. MIP ownership structure is a result of a complex political process that involves a 
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foreign  MNE in  collaboration  with  the  Chinese  government  and  other  partners  in  the 
project.  Strategic  choices  in  this  context  are  not  attributes  of  the  MNE to  establish  a 
subsidiary,  but are outcomes from negotiations and co-evolutionary adaptations between 
the  political  environment  (Chinese  government  policies  and  priorities),  the  industry 
environment (the demand and supply conditions in different segments of the value chain), 
and the main actors (foreign MNEs, Chinese SOE, and government officials.
Location choices are affected by the motives of the MNEs and the moderating factors of the 
partners. Confirming this expectation  we found that the JV investment projects represent 
66% of the total number of projects in our selection. 
From the total number of MIPs, 24% are lead by an American corporation, 33% are lead by 
a European MNE, 36% are lead by a Japanese firm, and 7% - by a corporation from other  
countries,  including  Korea  and  Taiwan.  This  distribution  is  consistent  across  all  other 
variables – geographic location and positioning within industrial segments. MIPs for which 
foreign companies do not have a controlling interest tend to be those contracted before the 
liberalization  of regulations  for entrance  restriction  and prohibiting  majority  ownership. 
Following the liberalisation of this sector in conjunction with China’s WTO entry, foreign 
investors have been able to establish more wholly owned projects.
The most attractive locations, according to the literature, are close to the consumer market, 
in order to capture market opportunities. Examples of such areas are Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Guangdong, Fujian, Shandong, Tianjin and other cities along the south and east 
coast,  and  all  of  them have  a  status  of  SEZs.  They  have  large  consumer  market  for 
petrochemical products, and MIPs in these regions have been facilitated by reduced costs of 
sales, and concentration of high-quality and comprehensive services. These factors have 
been the motives of MIPs to invest in the coastal cities and along the Yangtze River, Pearl 
River, although there are no oil deposits in these places. Exception, however, is the lack of 
MIPs  in  mainland  China  where  there  are  market  opportunities  but  not  sufficient  other 
incentives such as preferential policies on growth of the input and output markets.
MNEs  rely  on  their  superiority  in  capital,  technology,  and  marketing.  However,  their 
strategic choices are very much influenced by the institutional environment in China and 
the industry structure in different segments of the petrochemical industry.  
The results in our study indicate support for the theoretical expectation that the external 
environment  is  an  important  determinant  for  strategic  choices  of  MNEs  in  the 
petrochemical industry. It is believed that these factors are complementary to one another 
and explain  the  configuration  and  strategies  of  MIPs.  The findings  show that  industry 
concentration,  in  particular  the  clustering  of  foreign  and  domestic  firms,  exert  strong 
positive effects on FDI location choices. Higher FDI concentration tends to attract more 
foreign firms. Better institutional support such as open policies, government efficiency also 
has positive effects on FDI location. Institutional support in term of infrastructure and some 
government  policies  to  promote  integration  MIPs  have  also  had  a  positive  impact  on 
location choices. 
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Contrary to  some theoretical  expectations,  our  study did  not  find  strong effects  of  the 
country of  origin of  the lead MNE. Although European MNEs have shown higher 
propensity to engage in joint ventures (19% in EJV, and 6% in CJV), the US and the 
Japanese MNEs also were compelled to use this mode of entry (12% - 2% for the US 
and 18%-4% for Japan). Their distribution within the value chain also shows strong 
similarities with concentration of investments in downstream petrochemicals. 
Overall,  the  results  show the  strong exposure  of  he Chinese  petrochemical  industry to 
global competition and access of global manufacturing capabilities, both of which are 
prerequisites for its global integration and upgrade.
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